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AGAINST THE GEACHIAN THEORY OF THE 
TRINITY A N D INCARNATION 
Joseph Jedwab 
Relative-identity theories of the Trinity and Incarnation are worth another 
look. But not all such theories are the same. One important difference among 
them concerns restricted quantification. Peter Geach proposes two theses: 
the sortal relativity of identity and the irreducibility of restricted quantifi¬
cation. Every relative-identity theory of the Trinity and Incarnation applies 
Geach's first thesis. But only what 1 call "the Geachian theory" applies both 
theses. 1 argue that any such Geachian theory faces significant theoretical dis-
advantages. Towards the end, 1 propose a closely related but non-Geachian 
relative-identity theory that doesn't share those theoretical disadvantages. 
There are many theories of the Trinity and Incarnation. 1 Among them are 
relative-identity theories. Prima facie, the doctrine of the Trinity implies 
the sortal relativity of identity thesis, which says that, where "R" and " S " 2 
are sortals, it could be that for some x and y, x and y are the same R but 
different Ss. The Father and the Son are the same God, else they are two 
Gods, which implies polytheism and so is false. But the Father and the 
Son are different divine Persons, else they are one divine Person, which 
implies the Sabellian heresy and so is false. So the Father and the Son are 
the same G o d but different divine Persons. So relative-identity theories are 
worth another look. But, in the contemporary literature, few are spelled 
out in detail. 3 A n d not all such theories are the same. One important dif-
ference among these theories concerns restricted quantification. Peter 
Geach proposes, among others, two main theses: the sortal relativity of 
'For surveys see Michael Rea, "The Trinity," and Richard Cross, "The Incarnation," in The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C . Rea (Oxford: 
Oxford Universi ty Press, 2009). 
21 use italicized capital letters as schematic variables for sortals. When 1 add quotation 
marks to them, 1 mention the values. When 1 don't add quotation marks, 1 use the values. 
3There are three: Peter van 1nwagen, God, Knowledge, and Mystery (1thaca, N Y : Cornel l 
Universi ty Press, 1995); James Cain , "The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative 
1dentity," Religious Studies 25 (1989), 141-152; and Jeffrey Brower, "Abelard on the Trinity," 
in The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, ed. Jeffrey Brower and K e v i n G u i l f o y (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Universi ty Press, 2004), Michael Rea, "The Trinity," and "Hylomorph i sm and 
the incarnation," in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. A n n a Marmodoro and Jonathan 
H i l l (Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2011), and Jeffrey Brower and Michael Rea, "Material 
Constitution and the Trinity," Faith and Philosophy 22 (2005), 57-76. 
pp. 125-145 F A 1 T H A N D P H 1 L O S O P H Y Vo l . 32 No . 2 A p r i l 2015 
doi: 10.5840/faithphil201541335 
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identity and the irreducibility of restricted quantification. 4 Every relative-
identity theory applies Geach's first thesis to the Trinity and 1ncarnation.5 
But only what 1 call "the Geachian theory," which only James Cain has 
spelled out, applies both theses. 1 argue that, not only Cain's version, but 
any Geachian theory faces significant theoretical disadvantages. Towards 
the end, 1 propose a closely related but non-Geachian relative-identity 
theory that doesn't share those theoretical disadvantages. 
1. The Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation 
The Church, in her conciliar documents, teaches the doctrines of the Trinity 
and Incarnation. 6 The doctrine of the Trinity implies that there is only one 
God, there are only three divine Persons (i.e., the Father, the Son, and the 
Spirit), and each divine Person is God . The divine Persons have the same 
nature (i.e., deity). Since the Father is G o d and every other divine Person 
has the same nature as the Father, every other divine Person is also God. 
So the Trinity are three Persons who have the same nature. The doctrine of 
the 1ncarnation implies that the Son is G o d and human, having a rational 
soul and body. The Son, who has the divine nature, takes upon himself 
(or assumes) another nature (i.e., a humanity). Since we are humans and 
the Son has the same nature as we do, he is also human. So the Son is one 
Person who has two natures. 
What do we mean here by "Person"? We might say that this is a tech-
nical term and define it functionally: Persons are what there are three of 
in the Trinity (and one of i n the Son). We can, however, say what occupies 
this functional role. Something is a person just if some first- or second-
person singular pronoun (literally) applies to it. 7 1t is clear that the Father, 
the Son, and the Spirit are persons. Such pronouns apply to them. 1t is also 
clear, however, that they are different persons. The claim that the Father is 
the same person as the Son implies the Sabellian heresy. A n d if the Father 
were the same person as the Son, the Father could truly say of himself, 
4See Peter Geach, Reference and Generality, 3rd ed. (1thaca, N Y : Cornel l Universi ty Press, 
1980), §§30, 34, 110, and "Replies," in Peter Geach: Philosophical Encounters, ed. Har ry A . Lewis 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). 
5It's obvious how the sortal relativity of identity thesis applies to the doctrine of the 
Trinity. 1 explain later how it applies to the doctrine of the 1ncarnation too. 
6See the decrees of the first four ecumenical councils in Norman Tanner, Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils, vol.1 (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990). 
7 Cf . Peter Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1977), 75-76 and 
van 1nwagen, God, Knowledge, 231, 263-268. By "just i f " 1 mean if and only i f . This provides a 
necessary and sufficient condition for being a person. 1 do not intend, however, to provide 
a definition or explanation of what it is to be a person. When we apply such pronouns to 
non-persons (e.g., ships or pets), we personify: we don't literally apply such pronouns. A n d 
if I were to personify a non-person and if you were to ask me whether I intend to apply the 
pronoun literally, 1 wou ld deny it. 1ncidentally, this characterization of being a person has an 
interesting implication for the doctrine of the 1ncarnation. 1f such pronouns (literally) apply 
to Christ's human nature, then the human nature is a person. But this doesn't imp ly that the 
nature is a different person f rom the Son. A n d so this doesn't imp ly the Nestorian heresy. For 
it might be that the Son and his human nature are the same person. 
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using a first-person singular pronoun, "1 am the Son, who as a human 
suffered and died on the cross," which implies the Patripassion heresy. 1t 
also seems that G o d is a person. Such pronouns apply to God . Scripture 
and tradition consistently represent G o d as someone to whom first- and 
second-person singular pronouns apply. 8 Moreover, it seems any rational 
being (i.e., any being that has an intellect and will) is a person, and G o d is 
a rational being. Furthermore, it seems any being that is perfect in power, 
knowledge, and goodness is a person, and the concept of G o d is that of a 
perfect being, which implies being perfect in all these ways. Finally, since 
the Father is G o d and the Father is a person, some person is God . But, 
where "R" and "S" are sortals, by conversion, if some R is S, then it seems 
some S is R. So if some person is God, it seems some G o d is a person. A n d 
so, since there's only one God, it seems G o d is a person. 9 A t least, it seems 
a theoretical disadvantage for any theory of the Trinity or 1ncarnation to 
imply that G o d is not a person. 
Philosophical Problems for the Doctrines 
These doctrines give rise to various philosophical problems. The prob¬
lems 1 focus on here are the logical problem of the Trinity and the modal 
problem of the 1ncarnation. The logical problem of the Trinity concerns 
the apparent logical inconsistency of three claims: 
(1) There is only one God. 
(2) There are only three divine persons. 
(3) Every divine person is God . 
1t seems that any two of these claims imply the negation of the third. 1f 
we formalize (1)-(3) into first-order predicate logic wi th identity in the 
standard way, we have the following: 
Where we interpret " G x " as x is God and "Dx" as x is a divine person, 
(1') 3x(Gx&Vy(Gy3x=y) ) 
(2') 3x3y3z(Dx&Dy&Dz&x^y&x^z&y^z&Vu(Du3(u=xVu=yVu=z))) 
(3') V x ( D x 3 G x ) 
But (1 )-(3 ) are formally inconsistent. 
The modal problem of the Incarnation concerns the apparent impos¬
sibility of something being G o d and a human. 1t seems that: 
(4) Every G o d is a perfect being. 
(5) N o human is a perfect being. 1 0 
8 E.g. , Exodus 3:13-15. 
9 M o r e directly, since the Father is G o d and a person, it seems some God is a person and 
so, since there's only one G o d , it seems G o d is a person. 
1 0There are other pairs we could use to set up the problem here: e.g., every God is i m -
mutable, but every human changes; every G o d is impassible, but every human suffers. 
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The concept of G o d is that of a perfect being. But it seems no human is a per¬
fect being. The doctrine of the 1ncarnation, however, implies the following: 
(6) The Son is G o d and a human. 
1t seems these claims are logically inconsistent. 1f we formalize (4)-(6) into 
first-order predicate logic in the standard way, we have the following: 
Where we interpret " G x " as x is God, " H x " as x is a human, "Px" as x is a 
perfect being, and "s" as the Son, 
(4') V x ( G x 3 P x ) 
(5') ~3x(Hx&Px) 
(6') (Gs&Hs) 
But (4 )-(6 ) are formally inconsistent. 
What's the solution? Geach's two theses together promise a way out. 
First, 1 present the theses and say how they apply to numerical quanti¬
fiers and definite descriptions. Secondly, 1 present the promised solution. 
Thirdly, 1 present Cain's application of Geach's theses to the substitutivity 
of identity and sortal reduplication. Fourthly, 1 present Cain's theory of 
the Trinity and 1ncarnation. Fourthly, 1 raise problems for Cain's theory 
specifically and the Geachian theory more generally. Finally, 1 propose a 
non-Geachian relative-identity theory that doesn't share those problems. 
2. Geach's Theses 
Geach proposes two main theses: the sortal relativity of identity and the 
irreducibility of restricted quantification. 1 start wi th an example, which 1 
use to illustrate Geach's theses. 
The Cat Paradox 
Tibbles, the only cat on the mat, has at least 1,000 hairs—h', h 2 , h 3 , h 1 0 0 0 : 
N o w let c be the largest continuous mass of feline tissue on the mat. Then 
for any of our 1,000 cat hairs, say h n , there is a proper part c n of c which 
contains precisely all of c except the hair h n ; and every such part c n differs 
in a describable way both f rom any other such part, say cm, and f rom c as a 
whole. Moreover, f uzzy as the concept cat may be, it is clear that not only 
is c a cat, but also any part c n is a cat: c n wou ld clearly be a cat were the hair 
h n plucked out, and we cannot reasonably suppose that plucking out a hair 
generates a cat, so c n must already have been a cat. So, contrary to our story 
there was not just one cat called "Tibbles" sitting on the mat; there were at 
least 1,001 sitting there!1 1 
There are many proposed solutions to the paradox. 1 2 Geach offers one: 
"Everything falls into place if we realize that the number of cats on the mat 
1 1 Geach, Reference, 215. 
1 2See Michael Rea, "The Problem of Material Constitution," Philosophical Review 104 
(1995), 525-552, for a list of proposed solutions to the problem of material constitution of 
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is the number of different cats on the mat; and c 1 3, c 2 7 9, and c are not three 
different cats, they are one and the same cat. Though none of these 1,001 
lumps of feline tissue is the same lump of feline tissue as another, each is 
the same cat as any other: each of them, then, is a cat, but there is only one 
cat on the mat, and our original story stands." 1 3 
The Sortal Relativity of Identity 
The sortal relativity of identity says that: 
Where "R" and "S" are sortals, 
(SRI) 1t could be that for some x and y, x and y are the same R but dif¬
ferent Ss. 
For example, in the cat paradox, c and c 1 3 are the same cat but different 
lumps of feline tissue. A term "R" is a sortal just if the phrase "same R" 
has a meaning and "R"'s meaning includes a criterion of identity for Rs 
(e.g., "cat" is a sortal). A criterion of identity for Rs gives the conditions 
under which, for any x and y, x is the same R as y. For example, the crite¬
rion of identity for sets is that, for any x and y, x is the same set as y just 
if they have the same members. 1n addition, Geach claims that a criterion 
of identity for Rs is the standard by which we judge that the relation same 
R holds. 1 4 
Where "R" is a sortal, a sortal relativized identity predication is any 
sentence of the form "a is the same R as b" (e.g., "c is the same cat as c 1 3"). 
The standard analysis of such predications says that a is the same R as b 
just if a is the same as b and a is an R. For example, c is the same cat as c 1 3 
just if c is the same as c 1 3 and c is a cat. 1f (SR1) is true, however, the stan-
dard analysis is false. Suppose that a and b are the same R but different 
Ss. Then, since a and b are different Ss, a is an S. So a is the same S as a. So 
a has the feature of being the same S as a. But, since a and b are different 
Ss, b lacks this feature. So, by the indiscernibility of identicals, a is not the 
same as b. 1 5 So if a and b are the same R but different Ss, then a is the same 
R as b, but a is not the same as b. So if (SR1) is true, the standard analysis of 
sortal relativized identity predications is false. 
The Irreducibility of Restricted Quantification 
Where "R" is a sortal, a restricted universal quantification is any sentence 
of the fo rm "Every R is F." The unrestricted counterpart is any sentence 
of the fo rm "Everything is such that if it is an R, then it is F." A restricted 
existential quantification is any sentence of the form "Some R is F." The 
unrestricted counterpart is any sentence of the form "Something is such 
which this paradox is a version. 
1 3 Geach, Reference, 216. 
1 4See Geach, Reference, 63-64, "Replies," 293. 
1 5 The indiscernibility of identicals says that for any x and y, if x is the same as y, then they 
are indiscernible, i.e., they have the same features. 
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that it is an R and it is F." The standard analysis of restricted quantification 
reduces "Every R is F" to "Everything is such that if it is an R, then it is 
F," and "Some R is F" to "Something is such that it is an R and it is F." The 
irreducibility of restricted quantification says that restricted quantification 
is not so reducible: 
Where "R" is a sortal, 
(IRQ) (a) The claim that every R is F is weaker than the claim that ev¬
erything is such that if it is an R, then it is F, and (b) the claim that some 
R is F is stronger than the claim that something is such that it is an R 
and it is F. 
O n (1RQ), the claim that everything is such that if it is an R, then it is F, im¬
plies that every R is F, but not conversely. For example, Tibbles is the only 
cat and has each of the 1,000 hairs. 1 6 So it's true that every cat has each such 
hair. But c13 is a cat and lacks one such hair. So it's false that everything is 
such that if it is a cat, then it has each such hair. A n d , on (1RQ), the claim 
that some R is F implies that something is such that it is an R and it is F, 
but not conversely. For example, c 1 3 is a cat and lacks one such hair. So it's 
true that something is such that it is a cat and it lacks some such hair. But 
Tibbles is the only cat and has each such hair. So it's false that some cat 
lacks some such hair. So if (1RQ) is true, the standard analysis of restricted 
quantification is false. 
1f, however, restricted quantification is not so reducible, how are we 
to understand such quantification? Geach distinguishes names of and for 
Rs. 1 7 A name of an R is any name that refers to an R. But just as each 
sortal's meaning includes a criterion of identity, so, Geach believes, each 
name's meaning also includes a criterion of identity. 1 8 So a name for an 
R is any name whose meaning includes a criterion of identity for Rs. So 
every name is a name for something. A n d every non-empty name for an 
R is also a name of an R. But not every name of an R is a name for an R. 
For example, "Tibbles" is a name of and for a cat, but a name of and not 
for a lump. A n d "c" is a name of and for a lump, but a name of and not 
for a cat. 
Geach uses the distinction between names of and for Rs to provide 
rules for restricted quantification: 
"F(some A)" is true iff "F(a)" is true for some interpretation of "a" as a name 
of and for an A . 
"F(any A ) " is true iff "F(a)" is true for any interpretation of "a" as a name of 
and for an A. 
1 6 For simplicity, when 1 discuss the cat paradox, 1 often restrict the domain to things on 
the mat. 
1 7 Geach, Reference, 70. 
1 8 Geach, Reference, 67-68, "Replies," 287. 
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. . . 1f we delete f rom the above truth-conditions for "F(some A ) " and "F(any 
A ) " the restriction to proper names of and for an A , we obtain truth-condi-
tions for "For some x, F(x)" and "For any x, F(x)" respectively. 1 9 
So the rules are as follows: 
(REQ) Some R is F iff for some interpretation of "a" as a name of and 
for an R, a is F. 
(RUQ) Every R is F iff for every interpretation of "a" as a name of and 
for an R, a is F. 
Geach's theses affect the analysis of numerical and so of definite predi-
cation. I now look at each in turn. 
Numerical Quantifiers and Definite Descriptions 
Where "R" is a sortal, a numerical quantifier is any phrase of the form "At 
least n Rs (that are P)," "At most n Rs (that are P)," or "Exactly n Rs (that 
are P)." A n d a numerical predication is any sentence that consists of a 
numerical quantifier fol lowed by a predicate (e.g., "Exactly one cat that is 
on the mat purrs"). A definite description is any phrase of the form "The 
R (that is P)." A n d a definite predication is any sentence that consists of a 
definite description fol lowed by a predicate (e.g., "The cat that is on the 
mat purrs"). 
The standard analysis of numerical and definite predication goes like 
this: 
A t least one R is F iff something x is such that x is an R and x is F. 2 0 
A t least two Rs are F iff something x is such that x is an R, x is F, some¬
thing y is such that y is an R, y is F, and x is not the same as y. 
A t least three Rs are F iff something x is such that x is an R, x is F, some¬
thing y is such that y is an R, y is F, x is not the same as y, something z 
is such that z is an R, z is F, x is not the same as z, and y is not the same 
as z. 
A n d so on. 
The rest is easy: 
A t most n Rs are F iff it's false that at least n+1 Rs are F. 
Exactly n Rs are F iff at least and at most n Rs are F. 
The R is F iff exactly one R exists and is F. 2 1 
1 9 Geach, Reference, 206. 
2 0 A t least one R that is P is F iff something x is such that x is an R, x is P, and x is F. 1n each 
case, to add a restrictive relative clause, add a relevant conjunct. 
2 1 A t least one R exists iff something x is such that x is an R. 1n each case, to replace the 
predicate "is F " wi th the predicate "exists," subtract a relevant conjunct. A t most one R exists 
iff it's false that at least two Rs exist. Exactly one R exists iff at least and at most one R exists. 
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1n the standard analysis, we count by identity. 1f (SR1) is true, however, 
it could be that we count, not by identity, but by some sortal relativized 
identity relation. 2 2 For example, if we count by identity, there are at least 
1,001 cats. But there is only one cat. So, in this case, we count, not by iden¬
tity, but by the relation same cat. So we should revise the standard analysis 
at least this much. Replace each identity predicate wi th a sortal relativized 
one. 1f Geach's analysis of restricted quantification is correct, however, this 
revised analysis isn't enough. For example, c 1 3 is a cat and lacks one of the 
1,000 hairs. So it's true that something is such that it is a cat and it lacks 
some such hair. Tibbles, however, is the only cat and has each such hair. So 
it's false that at least one cat lacks some such hair. So if we apply Geach's 
analysis of restricted quantification, the analysis of numerical and definite 
predication goes like this: 
A t least one R is F iff some R x is such that x is F. 2 3 
A t least two Rs are F iff some R x is such that x is F, some R y is such that 
y is F, and x is not the same R as y. 
A t least three Rs are F iff some R x is such that x is F, some R y is such 
that y is F, x is not the same R as y, some R z is such that z is F, x is not 
the same R as z, and y is not the same R as z. 
A n d so on. 
The analysis of "At most n Rs are Fs," "Exactly n Rs are F," and "The R is 
F" is as before. So the analysis of definite predication is the following: 
(DD) The R (that is P) is F iff exactly one R (that is P) exists and is F. 2 4 
For example, the cat that is on the mat has each of the 1,000 hairs just if 
exactly one cat that is on the mat exists and has each such hair. 
The Solution to the Philosophical Problems 
Before 1 turn to Cain's application, we may now see how Geach's theses 
provide a solution to the problems raised. Recall that the fol lowing claims 
about the Trinity seem logically inconsistent: 
(1) There is only one God. 
(2) There are only three divine persons. 
(3) Every divine person is God . 
1f we apply (SR1), however, we may say the following. 1n the cat paradox, 
c, c 1 3, and c 2 7 9 are the same cat but different lumps. Though every such 
2 2See Geach, Reference, 63-64, "Replies," 285-286. 
2 3 A t least one R that is P is F iff some R x is such that x is P and x is F. Aga in , in each case, 
to add a restrictive relative clause, add a relevant conjunct. 
2 4 A t least one R exists iff some R x is such that x is the same R as x. A t least two Rs exist 
iff some R x is such that some R y is such that x is not the same R as y. The rest is as before. 
See Geach, Reference, 119, 150. 
AGAINST THE GEACHIAN THEORY OF THE TRINITY AND INCARNATION 133 
lump is a cat, counting by same cat, there is only one cat, and counting by 
same lump, there are at least 1,001 lumps. Similarly, the Father, the Son, and 
the Spirit are the same G o d but different divine persons. Though every 
divine person is God, counting by same God, there is only one God, and 
counting by same divine person, there are only three divine persons. 
So where we interpret " 3 G x " as some God x is such that, " 3 D x " as some 
divine person x is such that, " V G x " as every God x is such that, " V D x " as every 
divine person x is such that, " G x " as x is God, "Dx" as x is a divine person, 
"x=Gy" as x is the same God as y, and "x=Dy" as x is the same divine person as y, 
3 G X V G Y X = G Y 
( 2 " ) 3 D X 3 D Y 3 D Z ( X ^ D Y & X ^ D Z & Y ^ D Z & V D U ( U = D x V U = D y V U = D Z ) ) 
(3") V D X G X 
A n d (1")-(3") are formally consistent. 
Moreover, recall that the fol lowing claims about the 1ncarnation seem 
inconsistent: 
(4) Every G o d is a perfect being. 
(5) N o human is a perfect being. 
(6) The Son is G o d and a human. 
1f we apply (1RQ), however, we may say the fol lowing. Every cat has each 
of the 1,000 hairs, no lump less than maximal by only one such hair has 
each such hair, and c 1 3 is a cat and such a lump. Similarly, every G o d is 
a perfect being, no human is a perfect being, and the Son is G o d and a 
human. 
So where we interpret " V G x " as every God x is such that, " 3 H x " as some 
human x is such that, " G x " as x is God, " H x " as x is a human, "Px" as x is a 
perfect being, and "s" as the Son, 
(4") V G x P x 
(5") ~ 3 H X P X 
(6") (Gs&Hs) 
A n d (4")-(6") are formally consistent. 
3. Cain's Application of Geach's Theses 
Cain applies Geach's theses to come up with a substitutivity principle and 
a reduplication analysis, each of which is part of his theory. We now look 
at each in turn. 
Substitutivity and Indiscernibility 
D a v i d Wiggins challenges relative-identity theorists to provide substi-
tutivity of sortal relativized identity principles to explain the validity of 
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certain inferences that use such identity predicates. 2 5 Ca in tries to meet 
this challenge. 1 shall not, though, present his principle. 1f 1 did, 1 would 
have to introduce the technical concept of an extensional context. 1t is far 
easier to present the corresponding indiscernibility of sortal relativized 
identity principle, which doesn't use the concept of such a context. We lose 
nothing and gain much by way of ease of exposition. So the corresponding 
indiscernibility principle says: 
Where "R" is a sortal, 
(II) For any R x and any R y, if x is the same R as y, then they are indis¬
cernible. 
For example, where "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are names for planets, 
the argument "Phosphorus is the same planet as Hesperus; Phosphorus 
has the feature of appearing in the morning; so Hesperus appears in the 
morning" is valid. But, where "Tibbles" is a name for a cat and "c 1 3 " is a 
name for a lump, the argument "Tibbles is the same cat as c 1 3; Tibbles has 
the feature of having the hair h 1 3 ; so c 1 3 has h 1 3 " is invalid. 
Sortal and Nominal Reduplication 
Where "R" is a sortal, a sortal reduplication is any sentence of the form 
"As an R, a is F" (e.g., "As a cat, c 1 3 has the hair h 1 3"). A n d where "b R" is a 
name for an R, a nominal reduplication is any sentence of the form "As bR, 
a is F" (e.g., "As Tibbles, c 1 3 has the hair h 1 3"). 
Recall that the modal problem of the Incarnation concerns the apparent 
impossibility of something being G o d and a human. A n d recall that the 
fol lowing claims about the 1ncarnation seem inconsistent: 
(4) Every G o d is a perfect being. 
(5) N o human is a perfect being. 
(6) The Son is G o d and a human. 
The council of Chalcedon suggests another way to solve this problem, 
one that uses reduplication. The council says that the Son is "begotten 
before the ages f rom the Father as regards his divinity, and in the last 
days, the same for us and our salvation f rom Mary, the virgin God-bearer, 
as regards his humanity." 2 6 A natural way to read this is that the Son is 
begotten f rom the Father atemporally as God, but f rom Mary temporally 
as a human. This seems to imply that the Son is atemporal as God, but 
temporal as a human. Nothing, of course, is both temporal and atemporal. 
2 5 D a v i d Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Blackwell , 1980), 3 7 ^ 2 . 
2 6 "Def in i t ion of Faith," in Tanner, Decrees, 86. Moreover, C y r i l of Alexandria and Pope 
Leo, in letters that Chalcedon endorses, suggest that the Son is immutable, impassible, and 
immortal as G o d , but changes, suffers, and dies as a human. See "Second Letter of C y r i l to 
Nestorius," 4 1 ^ 2 , "Letter of C y r i l to John of Ant ioch ," 72-73, and "Letter of Pope Leo to 
Flavian," 78-80 in Tanner, Decrees. 
AGAINST THE GEACHIAN THEORY OF THE TRINITY AND INCARNATION 135 
The reduplicative strategy, however, says that not every claim of the form 
"as an R, a is F" implies a claim of the form "a is F." 
So perhaps the claim that as God, the Son is atemporal doesn't imply 
that the Son is atemporal. Or, more plausibly, the claim that as a human, 
the Son is temporal doesn't imply that the Son is temporal. Either way, we 
avoid contradiction. 1f we apply the reduplicative strategy to the modal 
problem of the 1ncarnation, we may say the fol lowing. Though not every¬
thing is such that if it is God, then it is a perfect being, everything is such 
that if it is God, then, as God, it is a perfect being. Or though something is 
such that it is a human and it is a perfect being, nothing is such that it is a 
human and, as a human, it is a perfect being. So even if the Son is a perfect 
being, as a human, the Son is not a perfect being. 
But how are we to understand such reduplication? Cain applies Geach's 
analysis of restricted quantification to provide an analysis of sortal redu¬
plication: 
Where "R" is a sortal, 
(SR) As an R, a is F iff some R is the same R as a and is F. 2 7 
For example, though c 1 3 lacks the hair h 1 3 , as a cat, c 1 3 has h 1 3 , which is 
true just if some cat is the same cat as c 1 3 and has h 1 3 . This also suggests an 
analysis of nominal reduplication: 
Where "R" is a sortal and "bR" is a name for an R, 
(NR) As bR, a is F iff bR is the same R as a and is F. 
For example, as Tibbles, c 1 3 has h 1 3 just if Tibbles is the same cat as c 1 3 and 
has h 1 3 . 
4. Cain's Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation 
We now consider Cain's application of Geach's theses to the doctrines of 
the Trinity and 1ncarnation. Ca in selects the fol lowing sortals, relativized 
identity predicates, and proper names, and asserts the fol lowing theo¬
logical statements and reduplicatives. 
Sortals: 
"x is a divine person" 
"x is G o d " 
"x is a human" 
Relativized Identity Predicates: 
"x is the same divine person as y" 
"x is the same G o d as y" 
"x is the same human as y " 
2 7 C a i n , "Doctrine of the Trinity," 147-148. 
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Proper Names: 
"The Father," "the Son," and "the Spirit" are names for divine persons. 
"Jesus" is a name for a human. 
"Christ" is a name for a divine person and for a human. 
Theological Statements: 
(7) Each of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit is a divine person and 
God. 
(8) Each of the Son, Jesus, and Christ is a divine person, God, and a 
human. 2 8 
(9) Each of the Father and the Spirit is not a human. 
(10) The Father, the Son, and the Spirit are the same G o d but different 
divine persons. 
(11) The Son, Jesus, and Christ are the same divine person, God, and 
human. 2 9 
Theological Reduplicatives: 
"As God, G o d is F" is equivalent to " G o d is F." 
"As a divine person, the Son is F" is equivalent to "the Son is F." 
"As the Son, the Son is F" is equivalent to "the Son is F." 
"As a human, Jesus is F" is equivalent to "Jesus is F." 
"As Jesus, Jesus is F" is equivalent to "Jesus is F." 
If G o d is impassible and if some G o d is the same G o d as the Son, then, 
by (SR), as God, the Son is impassible. If the Son is begotten and if some 
divine person is the same divine person as Jesus, then, by (SR), as a divine 
person, Jesus is begotten. If the Son is begotten and if the Son is the same 
divine person as Jesus, then, by (NR), as the Son, Jesus is begotten. If Jesus 
suffers and if some human is the same human as the Son, then, by (SR), 
as a human, the Son suffers. A n d if Jesus suffers and if Jesus is the same 
human as the Son, then, by (NR), as Jesus, the Son suffers. 
Obviously, G o d is God, but is G o d also a divine person or a human? 
I return to this in the next section. I now argue that Cain's theory faces 
problems in two areas: those of theological and Christological predication. 
2 8 Ibid. , 142, 144-145, 147-152. 
2 9(SRI) says that, where " R " and "S" are sortals, it could be that for some x and y, x and 
y are the same R but different Ss. A weaker version of (SRI) says that, where "R" is a sortal, 
it could be that for some x and y, x and y are the same R but discernible. Suppose that the 
Son and Jesus are the same divine person but discernible. Then the weaker version applies 
to the doctrine of the Incarnation. A n d this is how (a version of) (SRI) applies to the doctrine 
of the Incarnation. 
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Theological Predication 
A theological predication is any sentence of the fo rm " G o d is F" (e.g., 
"God is eternal"). Ca in argues that, though one can formalize " G o d ex¬
ists" as "something is G o d and is the same G o d as anything that is God," 
one can't formalize " G o d is F" as "something is God, is the same G o d as 
anything that is God, and is F." 3 0 If one does, then the claim that Jesus is 
G o d and suffers implies that G o d suffers simpliciter. Moreover, if this is so, 
then the claim that the Father is G o d and doesn't suffer implies that G o d 
also doesn't suffer simpliciter and so, since Jesus is G o d and suffers and 
the Father is G o d and doesn't suffer, G o d suffers and G o d doesn't suffer. 
Ca in takes these two results as a reason to revise the above analysis of 
theological predication. So, instead, Cain suggests the following: 
(G) G o d is F iff some G o d is the same G o d as anything that is G o d and 
is F . 3 i 
By (REQ), some G o d is the same G o d as anything that is G o d and is F just 
if for some interpretation of "aG" as a name for God, aG is the same G o d 
as anything that is G o d and is F. Since "Jesus" is not a name for God, the 
claim that Jesus is G o d and suffers doesn't formally imply that G o d suf¬
fers. Moreover, since "the Father" is not a name for God, the claim that the 
Father is G o d and doesn't suffer doesn't formally imply that G o d doesn't 
suffer either. 
There are two basic results that Cain's analysis of theological predica¬
tion yields. The first is that if G o d is F, it's false that G o d is not-F. For 
example, if G o d is eternal, it's false that G o d is non-eternal. Here's a proof. 
Suppose, for reductio, that G o d is F, and G o d is not-F. Then, by (G), some 
G o d is the same G o d as anything that is G o d and is F, and some G o d is the 
same G o d as anything that is G o d and is not-F. So, by (REQ), for some in¬
terpretation of "a G " as a name for God, a G is the same G o d as anything that 
is G o d and is F, and, for some interpretation of "bG" as a name for God, bG 
is the same G o d as anything that is G o d and is not-F. So "aG" and "bG" are 
names for God, aG is the same G o d as bG, and aG is F. So, by (II), bG is F. So 
bG is F and bG is not-F, which is a contradiction. So if G o d is F, it's false that 
G o d is not-F. So if G o d is begotten, it's false that G o d is unbegotten. A n d if 
G o d is incarnate, it's false that G o d is non-incarnate. We can't speak truly 
of begotten and unbegotten deity, or of incarnate and non-incarnate deity. 
We must choose. The least arbitrary option is to deny the positive and as¬
sert the negative predicates. Moreover, if G o d is begotten and so it's false 
that G o d is unbegotten, then, not only, as God, is the Son begotten, but 
also, as God, the Father is begotten, which is false. So, though the Father 
begets, the Son is begotten, and the Spirit proceeds, G o d neither begets, 
nor is begotten, nor proceeds. Furthermore, if G o d is incarnate and so it's 
3 0 C a i n , "Doctrine of the Trinity," 142-144. 
3 1 This is equivalent to an instance of (DD): G o d is F iff exactly one G o d exists and is F. 
138 Faith and Philosophy 
false that G o d is non-incarnate, then, not only, as God, is the Son incarnate, 
but also, as God, the Father is incarnate, which is also false. So, though the 
Son is incarnate, G o d is non-incarnate. A n d for similar reasons, on Cain's 
analysis, G o d is not a human. 
The second basic result is that, where "R" is a sortal, if G o d is the same 
R as a, and if G o d is the same R as b, then a is the same R as b. For example, 
if G o d is the same G o d as the Father, and if G o d is the same G o d as the 
Son, then the Father is the same G o d as the Son. Here's a proof. Suppose 
that G o d is the same R as a, and G o d is the same R as b. Then, by (G), some 
G o d is the same G o d as anything that is G o d and is the same R as a, and 
some G o d is the same G o d as anything that is G o d and is the same R as b. 
So, by (REQ), for some interpretation of "cG" as a name for God, cG is the 
same G o d as anything that is G o d and is the same R as a, and, for some 
interpretation of "dG" as a name for God, dG is the same G o d as anything 
that is G o d and is the same R as b. So "cG" and "dG" are names for God, cG 
is the same G o d as dG, and dG is the same R as b. So, by (II), cG is the same 
R as b. So cG is the same R as a, and cG is the same R as b. So, by the sym¬
metry and transitivity of same R, a is the same R as b. 3 2 So if G o d is the same 
divine person as the Father, and if G o d is the same divine person as the 
Son, then the Father is the same divine person as the Son. 
These results raise three problems: they imply that G o d is not a person, 
the Son is not G o d f rom God, and G o d is not born. Suppose, for reductio, 
G o d is a person. There are four options. The first option is that G o d is 
the same person as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, in which case the 
Father, the Son, and the Spirit are the same person, which is false. The 
second option is that G o d is the same person as only some pair of the 
Father, the Son, and the Spirit, in which case some pair of the Father, the 
Son, and the Spirit are the same person, which is again false. The third 
option is that G o d is the same person as neither the Father nor the Son 
nor the Spirit, in which case there are at least four persons who are divine, 
which is once again false. The fourth option is that G o d is the same person 
as only one of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Perhaps there is reason 
to say that G o d is the same person as only the Father because the Father 
is the origin of the other divine persons: the Father generates the Son and 
spirates the Spirit. In this case, one might think that something makes the 
Father more qualified to be the same person as God. But if the Father is 
more qualified than the Son, then he has a higher status than the Son and 
so the Son is subordinate to the Father in status, which implies the Ar i an 
heresy. If, however, we deny that the Father has such status, then there is 
no more reason to say that G o d is the same person as only the Father than 
there is to say that G o d is the same person as only the Son or the Spirit. 
A n y choice here is unprincipled. Moreover, if G o d is the same person as 
only the Father, then, not only, as God, is the Father the same person as the 
3 2 A relation R is symmetric iff for any x and y, if x stands R to y, y stands R to x, and transi-
tive iff for any x, y, and z, if x stands R to y, and if y stands R to z, x stands R to z. 
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Father, but also, as God, the Son is the same person as the Father, which 
is false. So none of the four options works. So G o d is not a person. But, as 
we saw above, it seems a theoretical disadvantage for any theory of the 
Trinity or Incarnation to imply that G o d is not a person. 
Both basic results presuppose (REQ), (G), and (II). We rightly assume 
that we should analyse " G o d " as a definite description, i.e., "the God." 
A n d there's no problem, in any case, wi th (G) as such. Rather, it's the way 
we use (REQ) to interpret (G) that creates difficulty. But if we reject (REQ), 
then we abandon any application of Geach's analysis of restricted quanti-
fication to that of theological predication. That leaves the indiscernibility 
principle (II). One might think that we can avoid the problem that G o d is 
not a person if we simply deny (II). A n d if we do this, we can indeed say 
that G o d is the same person as the Father and G o d is the same person as 
the Son, and this won't now formally imply that the Father is the same 
person as the Son. For some name for G o d "Alpha," A l p h a is the same 
person as the Father. A n d for some name for G o d "Beta," Beta is the same 
person as the Son. Since there's only one God, A l p h a and Beta are the same 
God. Since, however, we are denying (II), these claims won't now formally 
imply that A l p h a and Beta are indiscernible. But if A l p h a is the same di¬
vine person as the Father, what else is true of Alpha? Does A l p h a beget? 
A n d what of Beta, who is the same person as the Son? Is Beta begotten, 
incarnate, or a human? 
The least arbitrary way to develop this idea is as follows. For every 
name of G o d "a," there is a corresponding name for G o d "bG" such that 
a and bG are indiscernible. For example, "the Father" is a name of God, 
"Alpha" is the corresponding name for God, and so the Father and A l p h a 
are indiscernible. This idea, however, raises a problem. It leads to the 
exact same results the avoidance of which motivates Cain's analysis of 
theological predication i n the first place. Suppose this idea is right. Since 
"Jesus" is a name of G o d and Jesus suffers, G o d suffers. A n d since "the 
Father" is a name of G o d and the Father doesn't suffer, G o d also doesn't 
suffer. More importantly, this idea leads to the results the avoidance of 
which motivates Geach's analysis of restricted quantification. Again, sup-
pose this idea is right. In the cat paradox, since "c 1 3 " is a name of a cat 
and c 1 3 lacks hair h 1 3 , the cat lacks h 1 3 , which is false. A n d since "c" is a 
name of a cat and c has h 1 3 , the cat has h 1 3 . So we have a dilemma. Either 
G o d is not a person, or we abandon any application of Geach's analysis of 
restricted quantification to that of theological predication. But again, as 
we saw above, it seems a theoretical disadvantage for any theory of the 
Trinity or Incarnation to imply that G o d is not a person. So it seems we 
should abandon the application. 
That's the first problem. But there are two more: the basic results imply 
that the Son is not G o d f rom G o d and G o d is not born. If the Son is G o d 
f rom God, then the Son is f rom God, and so the Son is begotten by God, 
and so G o d begets the Son, and so G o d begets. But, as shown above, on 
Cain's theory, G o d doesn't beget. So, on Cain's theory, the Son is not G o d 
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f rom God. The first council of Nicaea, however, says that the Son is " G o d 
f rom G o d . " 3 3 Perhaps we should say that, though G o d doesn't beget, G o d 
begets as a divine person. In general, though, where "R" and "S" are sor-
tals, something is true of the R as an S only if the R is an S. For example, 
something is true of the cat as a lump only if the cat is a lump. Since, on 
Cain's theory, G o d is not a divine person, nothing is true of G o d as a divine 
person. Moreover, if the Son is G o d f rom God, then G o d is f rom God. But, 
on Cain's theory, even if G o d does beget, it's false that G o d is f rom G o d 
because the relation of being from is irreflexive. 3 4 Suppose, for reductio, that 
G o d is f rom God. Then, by (G), some G o d is f rom some God. So, by (REQ), 
for some interpretations of "aG" and "bG" as names for God, aG is f rom bG. 
So, by (II), a G is f rom aG. But, by irreflexivity, a G is not f rom aG. So, on Cain's 
theory, though the Son is f rom the Father, it's false that G o d is f rom God. 
Thirdly, if Mary is the God-bearer, then Mary bears God, so G o d is 
born f rom her, and so G o d is born. But if, on Cain's theory, G o d is non-
incarnate and non-human, then, for similar reasons, G o d is not born. So, 
on Cain's theory, Mary is not God-bearer. The council of Chalcedon, how¬
ever, says that the Son is " f rom Mary, the virgin God-bearer, as regards his 
humanity." 3 5 Perhaps we should say that, though G o d isn't born, G o d is 
born as a human. But since, on Cain's theory, G o d is not a human, nothing 
is true of G o d as a human. 
Christological Predication 
The second area in which Cain's theory faces problems is that of Chris-
tological predication. A Christological predication is any sentence of the 
form "Christ is F" (e.g., "Christ is God"). Cain assumes that the Son and 
Jesus are discernible. For example, Jesus but not the Son suffers. This 
assumption motivates his analysis of Christological predication. Cain's 
proposal has two parts. First, "Christ" is a name for a divine person and 
for a human. 3 6 Secondly, though everything true of the Son and Jesus is 
also true of Christ, everything true of the Son, but not Jesus, is true of 
Christ only as a divine person, and everything true of Jesus, but not the 
Son, is true of Christ only as a human. 3 7 Let's look at each part in turn. 
First, Cain proposes that "Christ" is a name for a divine person and 
for a human. This, however, raises a problem. By (II), since "the Son" and 
"Christ" are both names for divine persons, and since the Son is the same 
divine person as Christ, the Son and Christ are indiscernible. A n d , by (II), 
since "Jesus" and "Christ" are both names for humans, and since Jesus 
is the same human as Christ, Jesus and Christ are indiscernible. From 
these, it follows that the Son and Jesus are indiscernible, contrary to Cain's 
3 3Tanner, Decrees, 5. 
3 4 A relation R is irreflexive iff for any x, x doesn't stand R to x. 
3 5Tanner, Decrees, 86. 
3 6 C a i n , "Doctrine of the Trinity," 150. 
3 7 Ibid. , 149-150. 
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assumption that the Son and Jesus are discernible. There is a general 
problem here. Suppose "Christ" is a name. There are two options. First, it 
is a name for a divine person and for a human. In that case, by (II), the Son 
and Jesus are indiscernible. Secondly, "Christ" is a name only for a divine 
person or only for a human. But either choice is unprincipled. There is 
no more reason to say one than the other. So if we accept (II), and if we 
assume that the Son and Jesus are discernible, we must deny that "Christ" 
is a name. 
Secondly, Cain proposes that, though everything true of the Son and 
Jesus is also true of Christ, everything true of the Son, but not Jesus, is 
true of Christ only as a divine person, and everything true of Jesus, but 
not the Son, is true of Christ only as a human. This, however, raises an¬
other problem. Suppose that Jesus, but not the Son, suffers. Then, though 
as a human, Christ suffers, and, as a divine person, Christ doesn't suffer, 
it follows that Christ neither suffers nor doesn't suffer, which is impos¬
sible. The law of excluded middle says that for any proposition P, either 
P is true or not-P is true. This law is self-evident. The corresponding law 
that concerns objects and features says that for any object a and feature F, 
either a has F or a lacks F. This law is also self-evident, but Cain's proposal 
violates it. There is also a general problem here. Again, suppose "Christ" 
is a name. There are three options. First, everything true of either the Son 
or Jesus is also true of Christ, and otherwise not. In this case, since Jesus, 
but not the Son, suffers, Christ both suffers and doesn't suffer, which is 
impossible. Secondly, everything true of both the Son and Jesus is also 
true of Christ, and otherwise not. In this case, since Jesus, but not the Son, 
suffers, Christ neither suffers nor doesn't suffer, which is also impossible. 
Thirdly, everything true of the Son is true of Christ, and otherwise not, 
or else everything true of Jesus is true of Christ, and otherwise not. But, 
again, either choice is unprincipled. So if we assume that the Son and Jesus 
are discernible, we must again deny that "Christ" is a name. 
If "Christ" is not a name, perhaps it's a definite description: "the Christ." 
In this case, perhaps the term "a Christ" means a divine person who is the 
same divine person as the Son and Jesus. This, however, implies that the 
Son and Christ are indiscernible, which, as we saw before, is unprincipled. 
Abbreviate the predicate "is the same divine person as the Son and Jesus" 
by "is G . " Suppose, for reductio, that the divine person who is G and the 
Son are discernible. Then, for some feature F, the divine person who is G is 
F and the Son is not-F. By (DD), some divine person who is G is the same 
divine person as every divine person who is G and is F. So some divine 
person who is G is F. Unpacking the abbreviation, some divine person 
who is the same divine person as the Son and Jesus is F. So some divine 
person who is the same divine person as the Son is F. By (REQ), for some 
interpretation of a name for a divine person "a D ," aD who is the same di¬
vine person as the Son is F. So, by (II), the Son is F. So Christ and the Son 
are indiscernible. Similar considerations apply to the suggestion that "a 
Christ" means a human who is the same human as Jesus and the Son. 
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This would imply that Jesus and Christ are indiscernible, which, again 
as we saw before, is unprincipled. Indeed, any choice of definite descrip¬
tion here must use the sortal "divine person" or "human" and so lead to 
the same result. So, on Cain's theory, "Christ" is not a definite description 
either. O n Cain's analysis of Christological predication, "Christ" is neither 
a name nor a definite description. But it seems "Christ" is a name or a 
definite description. So it seems Cain's analysis of Christological predica¬
tion is false. 
5. A Non-Geachian Relative-Identity Theory 
I now propose a non-Geachian relative-identity theory closely related 
to Cain's own. We keep the same sortals, relativized identity predicates, 
proper names (except the name "Christ"), and theological statements. We 
also keep the distinction between names of and for Rs. This distinction, on 
its own, doesn't imply the irreducibility of restricted quantification. We 
must, however, revise the analysis of numerical predication, the indiscern-
ibility principle, sortal reduplication, and theological and Christological 
predication. 
First, we return to the initial revision of the standard analysis of nu¬
merical predication: 
Where "R" is a sortal, 
A t least one R is F iff something x is such that x is an R and x is F. 
A t least two Rs are F iff something x is such that x is an R, x is F, some¬
thing y is such that y is an R, y is F, and x is not the same R as y. 
A t least three Rs are F iff something x is such that x is an R, x is F, some¬
thing y is such that y is an R, y is F, x is not the same R as y, something 
z is such that z is an R, z is F, x is not the same R as z, and y is not the 
same R as z. 
A n d the rest is the same as before. 
Secondly, I propose, using the concept of a name for an R, the fol lowing 
indiscernibility principle: 
Where "R" is a sortal, 
(II') For any interpretation of "a R " and "b R" as names for Rs, if aR is the 
same R as bR, then they are indiscernible. 
Thirdly, I propose, again using the concept of a name for an R, the fol¬
lowing analysis of sortal reduplication: 
Where "R" is a sortal, 
(SR') As an R, a is F iff for some interpretation of "b R" as a name for an 
R, bR is the same R as a and is F. 
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Fourthly, in light of all this, I also propose the fol lowing analyses of 
theological and Christological predication: 
(G') G o d is F iff something is God, is the same G o d as anything that is 
God, and is F. 3 8 
(C) Christ is F iff something is the same divine person as the Son and 
Jesus, is the same divine person as anything that is the same divine 
person as the Son and Jesus, and is F. 3 9 
O n (G ), everything true of any divine person is true of God. So G o d is a 
divine person and G o d is a human. G o d begets, G o d is begotten, and G o d 
proceeds. A n d G o d is incarnate. But, though G o d is a divine person and 
G o d is a human, on (SR ), we still have the result that, as God, G o d is not 
a divine person and, as God, G o d is not a human. A n d , though G o d is 
begotten and incarnate, on (SR'), we still have the result that, as God, G o d 
is neither begotten nor incarnate. Now, however, since G o d is a divine 
person, on (SR ), we have the result that, as a divine person, G o d begets 
and, as a divine person, G o d is begotten. A n d now, since G o d is a human, 
on (SR ), we have the result that, as a human, G o d is born. 
O n (G ), we lack the two basic results of the Geachian theory: if G o d is 
F, it doesn't fol low that it's false that G o d is not-F; and if G o d is the same 
R as a, and if G o d is the same R as b, it doesn't fo l low that a is the same 
R as b. Since the Son is G o d and begotten, and since the Father is G o d 
and unbegotten, G o d is begotten and G o d is unbegotten. But it's false that 
G o d is both begotten and unbegotten. A n d since the Son is incarnate and 
the Father is non-incarnate, G o d is incarnate and G o d is non-incarnate. 
But, again, it's false that G o d is both incarnate and non-incarnate. One 
might object that to say G o d is non-incarnate seems false. One might reply, 
however, that to say G o d is non-incarnate is true but misleading because, 
though the claim is true, in many ordinary contexts, one would reasonably 
take the speaker to convey the claim that it's false that G o d is incarnate, 
which is false. 4 0 Moreover, since the Father is G o d and is the same divine 
person as the Father, and since the Son is G o d and is the same divine 
person as the Son, G o d is the same divine person as the Father and G o d is 
the same divine person as the Son. But it's false that the Father is the same 
divine person as the Son. 
We also avoid, on (G ), the three problems the Geachian theory faces. 
First, since each divine person is G o d and a person, G o d is a person. 4 1 
Secondly, since the Son is God, the Father is God, and the Son is f rom the 
3 8 C f . van Inwagen, God, Knowledge, 251; Brower and Rea, "Material Constitution," 69. 
3 9 C f . van Inwagen, God, Knowledge, 274. 
4 0 Ibid. , 256. 
4 1 Rea, "The Trinity," claims that x is a god =df x is a divine substance (407), that the divine 
nature is not a fourth person, but the divine nature is a substance (420). If the divine nature 
is G o d but a non-person, then God is a person, G o d is a non-person, but it's false that G o d is 
both a person and a non-person. 
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Father, G o d is f rom God. But it's false that G o d is f rom himself. Thirdly, 
since Jesus is G o d and Jesus is born, G o d is born. 
So, on (G ), G o d is a person. If, however, G o d is a person, one might 
well ask: which person is God? 4 2 In short, the answer is: each of the Father, 
the Son, and the Spirit. Since the Father is G o d and is the same person as 
the Father, G o d is the same person as the Father. A n d the same goes for 
the Son and the Spirit. But it's false that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit 
are the same person. 
O n (C), the word "Christ" is not a name but a definite description: the 
divine person who is the same divine person as the Son and Jesus. O n 
(C), everything true of the Son or Jesus is true of Christ. A n d so we avoid 
the problems the Geachian theory faces. Suppose Jesus, but not the Son, 
suffers. Jesus is the same divine person as the Son and Jesus. A n d Jesus 
suffers. So Christ suffers. Moreover, the Son is the same divine person as 
the Son and Jesus. A n d the Son doesn't suffer. So Christ doesn't suffer. But 
it's false that Christ both suffers and doesn't suffer. 
Finally, if for some interpretation of "a G " as a name for God, aG is the 
same G o d as Christ and aG is impassible, then, by (SR'), as God, Christ 
is impassible. If for some interpretation of "a D " as a name for a divine 
person, aD is the same divine person as Christ and aD is begotten, then, by 
( S R ' ) , as a divine person, Christ is begotten. A n d if for some interpreta-
tion of "a H " as a name for a human, aH is the same human as Christ and 
aH suffers, then, by (SR'), as a human, Christ suffers. Since "the Son" is 
a name for a divine person, and since the Son is the same divine person 
as anything that is the same divine person as Christ, by (II ), "as a divine 
person, Christ is F" is equivalent to "the Son is F." A n d since "Jesus" is a 
name for a human, and since Jesus is the same human as anything that is 
the same human as Christ, by (II ), "as a human, Christ is F" is equivalent 
to "Jesus is F." These are the right results. A n d not only that, this analysis 
of reduplicatives also provides, as shown above, a solution to the modal 
problem of the Incarnation. 
6. Conclusion 
Geach's theses solve the logical problem of the Trinity and the modal 
problem of the Incarnation. Cain's theory, however, which most plau¬
sibly applies those theses to the doctrines, faces problems in two areas. 
First, as to theological predication, the theory implies that G o d is not a 
person, the Son is not G o d f rom God, and G o d is not born. Secondly, as 
to Christological predication, the theory assumes that the Son and Jesus 
are discernible but implies that they are indiscernible and that, for some 
feature F, Christ is neither F nor not-F. Since the Geachian theory implies 
these things, it seems we should reject any such theory. The non-Geachian 
theory I proposed also solves the logical problem of the Trinity and the 
modal problem of the Incarnation, but lacks the implications of the Gea-
4 2 I owe this question to an anonymous referee. 
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chian theory. Of course, any non-Geachian theory, when ful ly articulated, 
may face its own problems and, on balance, the Geachian theory may 
be better. But we've made a start i n the evaluation of relative-identity 
theories by showing that, in these respects at least, the Geachian theory 
faces significant theoretical disadvantages compared to the proposed non-
Geachian alternative. 4 3 
Kuktown University 
4 3 I presented the paper at the Tyndale Fellowship Philosophy of Religion Study Group. 
M y thanks to Tom Flint and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
